Source: "Croscup's United States History" by George E. Croscup, B.A.; 1911; pgs 55-74 Transcribed by Kathy Leigh, March 29, 2001

CHAPTER VI
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
PAGE 4

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION,
1789 to 1840--51 Years

"It is a curious reflection that the United States Government, to begin with, was nothing but a few sheets of paper, lying in the drawer of the secretary of the Confederate Congress. Would the words ever have life substance, strength, significance, supremacy?" Many thought not, but that the government established would have a brief existence and then pass away. That such prophesies did not prove true was partially due to the character of the people and their long political training, and partially due to the ability of such men as Washington, Hamilton, and Marshall, who, in different ways, strengthened the hands of the national government.

1790

In December Hamilton's proposal to establish a Bank of the United States was introduced into Congress and led to an eager debate over the subject of the constitutionality of such a fiscal institution.

   This was the beginning of a long-struggle between persons and parties favoring a strict construction of the Constitution and others believing in a liberal interpretation of that document. At this time the opposing leaders were Jefferson, the strict constructionist, and Hamilton, the broad or liberal constructionist. Their views are clearly expressed in the following extracts from memoranda submitted to Washington.

   Jefferson's Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank . . . .1791.

   After arguing that Congress was not distinctly authorized to create a national bank, the Secretary of State asserted that the power to do so did not come within either of the general phrases, later called "elastic clauses."
   1. To lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States, that is to say, "to lay taxes for the purpose of providing for the general welfare," For the laying of taxes is the power, and the general welfare the purpose for which the power is to be exercised. They are not to lay taxes ad libitum for any purpose they please; but only to pay the debts or provide for the welfare of the Union. In like manner, they are not to do anything they please to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose. To consider the latter phrase, not as describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent power to do any act they please, which might be for the good of the Union, would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power completely useless.
   It would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of instituting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States; and, as they would be the sole judges of the good or evil, it would be also a power to do whatever evil they please.
* * * * *
   2. The second general phrase is, "to make all laws necessary, and proper for carrying into execution the enumerated powers." But they can all be carried into execution without a bank. A bank therefore is not necessary, and consequently not authorized by this phrase.
* * * * *
   Can it be thought that the Constitution intended that for a shade or two of convenience, more or less, Congress should be authorized to break down the most ancient and fundamental laws of the several States; such as those against mortmain, the laws of alienage, the rules of descent, the acts of distribution, the laws of escheat and forfeiture, the laws of monopoly? Nothing but a necessity invincible by any other means can justify such a prostitution of laws, which constitute the pillars of our whole system of jurisprudence. Will Congress be too strait-laced to carry the Constitution into honest effect, unless they may pass over the foundation-laws of the State government for the slightest convenience of theirs?
   Hamilton's Opinion as to the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States,. . . .1791.
   Now it appears to the Secretary of the Treasury that this general principle is inherent in the very definition of government, and essential to every step of progress to be made by that of the United States, namely: That every power vested in a government is in its nature sovereign, and includes, by a force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power, and which are not precluded by restrictions and exceptions specified in the Constitution, or not immoral, or not contrary to the essential ends of political society. [This is the doctrine of implied powers.]
* * * * *
   The first of these arguments is: That the foundation of the Constitution is laid on this ground: "That all powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited to it by the states, are reserved for the states, or to the people." Whence it is meant to be inferred that Congress can in no case exercise any power not included in those not enumerated in the Constitution. And it is affirmed that the power of erecting a corporation is not included in any of the enumerated powers.
   The main proposition here laid down, in its true significance, is not to be questioned. It is nothing more than a consequence of this republican maxim, that all government is a delegation of power. But how much is delegated in each case, is a question of fact, to be made out by fair reasoning and construction, upon the particular provisions of the Constitution, taking as guides the general principles and general ends of governments.
   It is not denied that there are implied as well as express powers, and that the former are as effectually delegated as the latter. And for the sake of accuracy it shall be mentioned, that there is another class of powers, which may be properly denominated resulting powers. It will not be doubted that if the United States should make a conquest of any of the territories of its neighbors, they will possess sovereign jurisdiction over the conquered territory. This would be rather a result, from the whole mass of the powers of the government, and from the nature of political society, than a consequence of either of the powers specially enumerated.

1791

The national government suppressed the so-called "Whiskey Insurrection" in Pennsylvania.

   The government not only was able to prove its right to lay such a tax, but further that it could count on the state militia to help suppress domestic insurrections.

1794

"Jay's treaty" brought up the question as to whether Congress had the constitutional right to withhold an appropriation necessary to carry into effect a treaty made by the President and ratified by the Senate.

   The matter was not decided at this time, for Congress reluctantly made the appropriation, but it has since been established that a "later conflicting law supersedes or breaks the earlier treaty."

1798

The Alien and Sedition Acts, passed as a result of Federalist fear of Jacobin clubs and Anti-Federalist newspaper editors, brought out the celebrated VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS.

   This may be said to be the real beginning of the nullification and secession movement. The strongest of the Resolutions was one written by Jefferson for Kentucky. It read:
   "Resolved, That the several states comprising the United States of America are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government, but that by compact under the style and title of a Constitution for the United States, and amendments thereto, they constituted a general government, for special purposes, delegated to that government certain definite powers, reserving each state to itself the residuary mass of their right to their own self-government, and that whensoever the general government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force; that to this compact each state acceded as a state, and is an integral party; that this government created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that as in all other cases of compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions, as of the mode and measure of redress."

The ELEVENTH AMENDMENT was added to the Constitution, denying the right of a state to be sued by the citizens of another state or by foreigners.

   This grew out of the celebrated case of Chisholm vs. Georgia.

1799

Most of the states refused to unite with Virginia and Kentucky in their resolutions.

   The New York legislature declared, February 16, "that as the right of deciding on the constitutionality of laws passed by the Congress of the United States doth pertain to the judiciary department of the government, this house doth accordingly disclaim the power assumed in and by the communicated resolutions."

18O3

Jefferson purchased Louisiana. Inasmuch as the Constitution is silent on the subject of the acquisition of territory the Federalists claimed the President had violated his principle of strict construction.

   It is now assumed that the President's action came constitutionally within his treaty-making power.

The SUPREMACY OF THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION of the nation over state law was maintained in the celebrated Supreme Court case of Marbury vs. Madison.

   This was one of the important cases decided during the time of Chief Justiceship of John Marshall.

EXTRACT FROM DECISION IN THE CASE OF MARBURY vs. MADISON,-1803

   The question whether an act repugnant to the Constitution can become a law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the United States; but happily not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognize certain principles supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it. . . . That the people have an original right to establish for their future government such principles as in their opinion shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The original supreme will organizes the government and assigns to the different departments their respective powers. . . The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited and to what purpose is that limitation committed in writing, if those limits may at any time be passed by those intended to be restrained? . . . The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and like any other act is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not a law. If the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a power in its own nature illimitable. . . . If an act of the legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void, does it, notwithstanding its validity, bind the courts and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not a law, does it constitute a rule as operative as though it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory; and would seem at first view an absurdity too gross to be insisted upon. It shall, however, receive a more attentive consideration. It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide upon the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case so that the court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution disregarding the law--the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply. Those, then, who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution and see only the law.

1804

The TWELFTH AMENDMENT was added to the Constitution, providing for the election of President and Vice-President on separate ballots.

1807

The passage by Congress of the Embargo Act, December 22, was a most liberal use of the doctrine of "implied powers" and strengthened the control of Congress over commerce.

   Nowhere in the Constitution is Congress authorized to prohibit all trade with other countries. By this time the Democratic-Republican party had really abandoned their strict constructionist principles.

1814

The hostility of New England to the administration of Madison and to the prosecution of the War of 1812 led to the HARTFORD CONVENTION, which suggested certain amendments to the Constitution and was accused of favoring the doctrines of nullification and secession.

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE HARTFORD CONVENTION-1814

   Therefore resolved,--That it be and hereby is recommended to the legislatures of the several states represented in this Convention, to adopt all such measures as may be necessary effectually to protect the citizens of said states from the operation and effects of all acts which have been or may be passed by the Congress of the United States, which shall contain provisions, subjecting the militia or other citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or impressments, not authorized by the Constitution of the United States.
   Resolved.--That the following amendments of the Constitution of the United States be recommended to the States aforesaid, to be proposed by them for adoption by the State Legislatures, and, in such cases as may be deemed expedient by a Convention chosen by the people of each State.
   And it is further recommended, that the said States shall persevere in their efforts to obtain such amendments, until the same shall be effected.
   First.--Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers of free persons, including those bound to serve for a number of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, and all other persons.
   Second.--No new State shall be admitted to the union by Congress in virtue of the power granted by the Constitution, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses.
   Third.--Congress shall not have power to lay any embargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United States in the ports or harbors thereof, for more than sixty days.
   Fourth.--Congress shall not have power, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses, to interdict the commercial intercourse between the United States and any foreign nation or the dependencies thereof.
   Fifth.--Congress shall not make or declare war, or authorize acts of hostility against any foreign nation, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses, except such acts of hostility be in defense of the territories of the United States when actually invaded.
   Sixth.--No person who shall hereafter be naturalized, shall be eligible as a member of the Senate or House of Representatives of the United States, nor capable of holding any civil office under the authority of the United States.
   Seventh.--The same person shall not be elected President of the United States a second time; nor shall the President be elected from the same State two terms in succession.
   Resolved.--That if the application of these States to the government of the United States, recommended in a foregoing Resolution, should be unsuccessful, and peace should not be concluded, and the defense of these States should be neglected, as it has been since the commencement of the war, it will in the opinion of this Convention be expedient for the Legislatures of the several States to appoint Delegates to another Convention, to meet at Boston, in the State of Massachusetts, on the third Thursday of June next, with such powers and instructions as the exigency of a crisis so momentous may require.

1819

The celebrated Supreme Court case of McCulloch vs. the State of Maryland established the validity of the doctrine of "implied powers" as applied to the creation of a national bank and decided that a law of Maryland taxing such a bank was unconstitutional.

DECISION IN THE CASE OF McCULLOCH vs. THE STATE OF MARYLAND

   In the case now to be determined, the defendant, a sovereign State, denies the obligation of a law enacted by the legislature of the Union; and the plaintiff on his part contests the validity of an act which has been passed by the legislature of that State. The Constitution of our country, in its most interesting and vital parts, is to be considered; the conflicting powers of the Union and its members, as marked in that Constitution, are to be discussed; and an opinion given, which may essentially influence the great operations of the government. No tribunal can approach such a question without a deep sense of its importance and of the awful responsibility involved in its decision. But it must be decided peacefully, or remain a source of hostile legislation, perhaps of hostility of a more serious nature; and if it is to be so decided, by this tribunal alone can the decision be made. On the Supreme Court of the United States has the Constitution of our country devolved this important duty.
   Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establishing a bank, of creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in the instrument, which, like the articles of confederation, excluded incidental or implied powers; and which requires everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the 10th amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word "expressly," and declares only that the powers "not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states or to the people;" thus leaving the question whether the particular power which may become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole instrument.
   We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with regard to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional. . . .
   The court has bestowed on this subject its most deliberate consideration. The result is a conviction that the states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional law as enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government.
   This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the Constitution has declared.
   We are unanimously of the opinion that the law passed by the legislature of Maryland, imposing a tax on the Bank of the United States, is unconstitutional and void.
   This opinion does not deprive the states of any resources they originally possessed. It does not extend to any tax paid by the real property of the bank, in common with the real property within the state, nor to a tax imposed on the interests which the citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in common with other property of the same description throughout the state. But this is a tax on the operations of the bank, and is, consequently, a tax on the operation of an instrument employed by the government of the Union to carry its powers into execution. Such a tax must be unconstitutional.

In the Supreme Court case of the Trustees of Dartmouth College vs. Woodward, a state law, impairing the obligation of contracts, was voided.

1820

Congress, by the MISSOURI COMPROMISE, exercised the right of prohibiting slavery within the territories of the United States.

1822

President Monroe vetoed a bill for improving the Cumberland Road, claiming the nation could not interfere with state transportation or internal improvements.

   Madison had already, in 1817, vetoed a similar bill.

1823

Congress began the work of internal improvements by inserting in an appropriation bill, which the President had to accept, provision for the improvement of a harbor.

Monroe, in his presidential messages, elaborated the so-called "MONROE DOCTRINE."

"This doctrine is not law but the declaration of a policy." Thus the executive department is able, without Constitutional warrant, to establish a foreign policy and establish it as a part of the law of nations.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE-1823

   Taken from President Monroe's Message to Congress, December 2, 1823. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 207-220.

At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable negotiation the respective rights and interest of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. . . . In the discussion to which this interest has given rise and in the arrangement by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . . . The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, and by the causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments; and to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and have maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. . . .
   Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have, so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to those continents circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and the new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course.

1824

The Supreme Court in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden declared that the constitutional right given Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states" included the right to regulate navigation in general.

   This was the beginning, from which Congress has by successive stages built up a control over interstate commerce, applying "not merely to exchange of material commodities, but to transportation by land and water, and to communication by coach, boat, railroad, telegraph, and telephone."

1830

Webster, in the Webster-Hayne debate, maintained that the Constitution was an instrument of government created by the sovereign people of the United States.

1832

South Carolina attempted to nullify the operations of the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832.

V. NATIONAL vs. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT,
1840 to 1865--25 yrs.

1845

TEXAS was annexed by a joint resolution of Congress.

   Considerable criticism was leveled at this act by the Whigs on the ground that it was unconstitutional. But the same method of annexation has since been employed in the case of Hawaii.

1850

The Fugitive Slave Act of the Compromise of 1850 was an attempt to strengthen the constitutional provision requiring the return of such fugitives.

1854

The KANSAS - NEBRASKA ACT provided for popular sovereignty in these territories.

   This seemed a violation of a previous compromise, that of 1820, which to many was as binding as the Constitution itself.

The Personal Liberty Laws of the Northern States practically nullified the operation of an act of Congress, the Fugitive Slave Act.

1857

In the DRED SCOTT CASE the Supreme Court held that Congress could not prohibit slavery in any part of the national territory and that the Missouri Compromise was therefore unconstitutional and void.

SECESSION ATTEMPTED

1860

Lincoln was elected President on a platform which denied the right of Congress to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of the United States.

   South Carolina immediately called a constitutional convention, December, and repealed the Act of 1788, by which that state had adopted the Constitution, and pronounced the union between South Carolina and the United States of America dissolved. Was the union established by the Constitution "indestructible"? Was it "perpetual"? Could states secede, according to the Constitution? The verdict of the long and bloody war was that the Constitution created an "indestructible union of indestructible states."
Table showing the confederate states and their secession

1861

The CONSTITUTION OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY, passed this year, was largely a literal copy of the Constitution of the United States. The most interesting and significant departures from the original are to be found in the following paragraphs.

   Extracts from the Constitution of the Confederate States of America 1861.

   We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and independent character, in order to form a permanent federal government, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity--invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God--do ordain and establish this Constitution of the Confederate States of America.

ARTICLE I

   Section 1.--All legislative powers herein delegated shall be vested in a Congress of the Confederate States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
   Section 2.-The House of Representatives shall he chosen every second year by the people of the several States * * * *; but no person of foreign birth, not a citizen of the Confederate States, shall be allowed to vote for any officer, civil or political, State or Federal.
   Section 6.-- * * * * Congress may, by law, grant to the principal officer in each of the Executive Departments a seat upon the floor of either House, with the privilege of discussing any measure appertaining to his department.
   Section 7--
   2. * * * * The President may approve any appropriation and disapprove any other appropriation in the same bill. In such case he shall, in signing the bill, designate the appropriations disapproved; and shall return a copy of such appropriations, with his objections, to the House in which the bill shall have originated, and the same proceedings shall then be had as in case of other bills disapproved by the President.
   Section 8.--The Congress shall have power--
   1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, for revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for the common defense, and carry on the Government of the Confederate States; but no bounties shall be granted from the treasury; nor shall any duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or foster any branch of industry; and all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the Confederate States.
   3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes; but neither this, nor any other clause contained in the Constitution, shall be ever construed to delegate the power of Congress to appropriate money for any internal improvement intended to facilitate commerce * * *
   To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the Confederate States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. * * *

ARTICLE V

Section 1.--Upon the demand of any three States, legally assembled in their several Conventions, the Congress shall summon a Convention of all the States, to take into consideration such amendments to the Constitution as the said States shall concur in suggesting at the time when the said demand is made; and should any of the proposed amendments to the Constitution be agreed on by the said Convention--voting by States--and the same ratified by the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, or by Conventions in two-thirds thereof--as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the general Convention--they shall thenceforward form a part of this Constitution. But no State shall, without its consent, be deprived of its equal representation in the Senate.

During the year the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by Lincoln brought up the constitutional question as to what power, the executive or the judicial, had the right to suspend the writ in case of war.

   The President was eventually allowed to exercise this right as well as other rights, such as seizing property without "due process of law." The exercise of such rights makes the President a dictator in time of war.

VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION,
1865 to 1911-46 Years

The period following the close of the war was marked by a vigorous assertion of national powers under the Constitution. This was due partially to the outburst of national feeling engendered by the war and partially to the increase of national authority made necessary by its prosecution. During more recent years there have been increases of national authority in connection with the attempts of the government to curb the trusts.

1865

The institution of slavery was destroyed by the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution.

1867

Congress passed its plan for reconstruction.

   The end of the war left the status of the seceding States in doubt. If the Southern States were out of the Union, then the attempt at secession had succeeded. Were they still parts of the Union, but out of their proper constitutional relation? Had the war caused them to become territories, or to become conquered provinces?
   The idea finally prevailed that by the rebellion they had forfeited their rights and could only get them back again on conditions exacted by Congress. This right of Congress to restore a State to its proper condition was maintained by the Supreme Court in the case of Texas vs. White, 1868.

1868

The negro was given citizenship by the fourteenth amendment and States were to lose a percentage of their representation in Congress if they abridged the rights of citizens, including the right to vote in State and national elections.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON WAS IMPEACHED by the House of Representatives and tried by the Senate.

   The necessary two-thirds majority for conviction was not secured. The trial seemed to be one based on political differences rather than on any treasonable acts of the President. This fact and the additional one that some of the Senators feared an undue subordination of the executive to the legislative in case of conviction assisted in the failure to convict.

1870

The negro was given the ballot by the fifteenth amendment.

The Supreme Court in the first of the so-called Legal Tender Cases decided that Congress could not issue "Greenbacks" in "time of peace."

   The court reversed this decision in both 1872 and 1884.

1873

In the Slaughter House Cases the Supreme Court passed in review the first clause of the fourteenth amendment.

   It decided that the States could regulate by State laws the civil rights possessed by a citizen of a State. This was confirmed by the Civil Rights Cases (1883) when the law of Congress passed in 1875 prohibiting any discrimination by railroads, innkeepers, and others on account of color was held to be unconstitutional, because such civil rights were rights to be conferred or withheld by the States.

1877

The national government, at the request of State officials, sent troops to suppress the railroad strike of this year.

1883

According to the Pendleton Act the appointment of many national civil service employees was placed under a system of competitive examinations. This limited the appointing power of the President.

1887

The control of Congress over interstate business was extended by the INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT.

1890

Congress began to regulate trusts, passing in this year the celebrated ANTI-TRUST ACT. The act declared that combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade were unlawful and punishable by fine and imprisonment.

1903

Congress forbade rebating.

1906

The power of Congress over interstate affairs was still further increased by a more stringent Interstate Commerce Act.

1911

The Supreme Court upheld the right of the INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION to fix maximum railway rates.

The various State legislatures considered a constitutional amendment to establish an income tax. Many ratifications were secured.

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